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We contribute to multinationality and real options theories by considering the role of firm 
heterogeneity in real options awareness for MNCs. We test the joint impact of real options 
awareness (RO-AWN) and multinationality on firm value using an extensive sample of U.S-listed 
international firms over the ten-year period 1996-2005. We show that when a firm’s growth 
options and degree of RO-AWN are considered, multinationality has a significant positive impact 
on firm value and performance as measured by Tobin’s Q, return-on-assets and the 3-year average 
stock returns. We find that the benefits of multinationality accrue asymmetrically to firms differing 
in RO-AWN. Managers who are more aware of their corporate real options are able to 
significantly enhance firm value. Our findings are robust to a range of dataset and measurement 
specifications, endogeneity issues and controlling for alternative theories of the firm. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Real options theory (ROT) suggests that strategic growth options and multinational flexibility 
switch options enable firms to adapt to business uncertainty and enhance corporate value (Kogut 
and Kulatilaka, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). Little is known, however, about the role of firm practices 
and management in recognizing, exploiting and managing real options opportunities (Coff and 
Laverty, 2001; Adner and Levinthal, 2004; Barnett, 2008; Hackbarth, 2009), leaving largely 
unaddressed the question of how value creation actually does take place in multinational 
corporations (MNCs). Recent work by Tong and Reuer (2007) and Driouchi and Bennett (2011) 
provides evidence that heterogeneous managerial characteristics can affect the relationship 
between multinationality and firm downside risk. Also related and directly relevant, Aabo et al. 
(2016) document how heterogeneity in firm characteristics alters the real options facilitating 
effects of multinationality on firm value. Yet, there is little evidence on the impact of managerial 
quality, practices and particularly real options attention on firm value and upside performance. To 
study this issue, one needs to account for related categories of real options and consider 
multinational flexibility effects jointly, besides controlling for endogeneity and alternative theories 
of the multinational firm. Examining the broader spectrum of real option platforms available to 
the firm and their impact on value and performance is important for two main reasons: first, to 
understand how real options know-how and practices affect the value creation process involving 
different types of real options (and their potential interactions); and second, to assess the degree of 
integration and coordination of real option related resources and managerial attention within firms 
(e.g., whether real options are managed as a bundle owing to a high awareness of interactions or 
treated in isolation). 
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Our study provides new and comprehensive evidence on the heterogeneity of real options 
practice and attention, and its effects on long-term value creation and performance, across all US-
listed multinational firms over the period 1996-2005. To our knowledge, this is the first research 
to study real options practice, management quality and the real options determinants of firm value 
by considering growth options, multinational switching and operating options all together. We 
examine the joint effect of multinationality and real options awareness (RO-AWN) on firm value 
and performance as measured by Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA) and the three-year average 
stock returns, while also explicitly accounting for other determinants of MNC value creation 
postulated by alternative theories of the firm. As such, this paper complements the single-option 
focused contributions of Tong et al. (2008a) and Driouchi and Bennett (2011) on the role of 
heterogeneous characteristics on IJVs and downside risk.2 It also supplements recent work in 
financial economics and management confirming that differences in management practices across 
firms can help explain differences in value and performance (see e.g., Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Antia et al., 2010; Mishra, 2014; Cheung et al., 2017).  
A key premise of our paper is that firms are heterogeneous in their ability to realize the real 
option benefits of multinationality (e.g., Allen and Pantzalis, 1996; Pantzalis, 2001; Aabo et al., 
2016). This is partly a result of organizational differences in the identification, maintenance and 
exercise of real options opportunities (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Barnett, 2008). Borrowing from 
management theory, we address this source of heterogeneity by examining how real options 
                                                 
2 Emphasizing multinational switching only and controlling for basic firm characteristics, Driouchi and Bennett (2011) 
test the moderating role of real options awareness in the multinationality-downside risk relationship on a sample of 
large multinational corporations. Our paper differs in a number of respects: 1) it examines the determinants of firm 
value in all US-listed international firms, 2) it studies the value implications of real options while accounting for the 
antecedents of multinationality, growth options and real options awareness, 3) it controls for alternative theories of 
the firm and endogeneity, and 4) it studies a larger sample of aware firms.  Tong et al. (2008a) focus on growth option 
value in the context of international joint ventures only. Focused on value creation, our multiple options paper differs 
by looking at awareness, as well as multinational flexibility and real options effects, simultaneously and 
comprehensively. 
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awareness (RO-AWN), as a proxy for real options practice and management’s differential ability 
to recognize, appraise and exercise real options opportunities, affects the relationship between 
multinationality (MULTI) and firm value, quantifying both its direct and indirect effects on 
valuation and performance outcomes. From a behavioral perspective, RO-AWN influences the 
mental frame that shapes managers’ ability to identify, develop and exploit real options 
opportunities. It also affects the identification of shadow options and their transformation into real 
options resources to be exploited by firms (Hurry et al., 1992; Barnett, 2005). Through sense-
making and active search, real options awareness provides managers with knowledge and 
information to both learn from uncertainty and exercise flexibility in decision making (Bowman 
and Hurry, 1993). As a firm-specific characteristic, RO-AWN also helps clarify how the benefits 
from multinational switching flexibility and other forms of real options should depend on the 
active role of managers in uncertain business environments. We posit that a firm’s real option 
value potential can be fully realized only if managers are strongly aware of (and pay proper 
attention in terms of integration, coordination and exercise decisions to) the real option 
opportunities available in operational and strategic choices. Differences in RO-AWN across 
multinational firms should, therefore, help explain long-term firm value and performance 
differentials.   
We provide a real options explanation of how heterogeneous managerial attention and 
practices in the form of RO-AWN can alter the relationship between multinationality (in terms of 
the scope and breadth of international operations) and firm value, leading to competitive advantage 
in an uncertain global business environment. Based on evidence of real options practice in industry 
(e.g., Billington et al., 2002; Hartmann and Hassan, 2006), we revisit the valuation and flexibility 
implications of multinational real options in terms of firm heterogeneity (Kogut, 1984; Kogut and 
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Kulatilaka, 2001). The notion of RO-AWN is backed up by observation of real options adoption in 
a number of corporations (e.g., Triantis and Borison, 2001; Li, 2007; Driouchi and Bennett, 2012), 
and is linked to the role of knowledge, learning and adaptability in firm evolution and upside 
performance (e.g., Kogut, 1984; Miller, 2002).3 RO-AWN presupposes the ability to pay attention 
to real options (Barnett, 2005, 2008) and is accompanied by organizational investments in real 
options learning and decision support, thus contributing to management quality. The outcomes 
from such learning can serve as inimitable knowledge resources and capabilities available to the 
firm (Bowman and Moscowitz, 2001) and result in the development of an awareness specificity 
for each firm. This specificity influences the nature of the relationship between real options and 
firm performance, contributing both directly and indirectly to value creation.  
Using panel data on a large sample of U.S. international (non-financial) firms differing in 
their degree of real options awareness, growth options and multinationality, we unveil the value-
enhancing and moderating impact of RO-AWN on multinational firm value. To study the 
underlying mechanisms in a robust manner, we control for value driver effects predicted by other 
theories of the multinational firm (e.g., internalization, market power, diversification, transaction 
cost economics, growth opportunities). This helps isolate our real options predictions from 
complementary theory effects, providing a cleaner estimation of the relationship between real 
options awareness and long-term value. We moreover employ a two-stage multivariate model of 
firm value, considering endogeneity, reverse-causality and self-selection bias issues, while 
accounting for the drivers of multinationality, future-oriented growth options and awareness 
effects through propensity score matching and Heckman estimation procedures (Heckman, 1979; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Mishra, 2014; de Andres et al., 2017). Our findings are robust to 
                                                 
3 A subset of firms in our sample are users and adopters of the real options “technology” (Mun, 2003; Trigeorgis, 
2005). 
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alternative definitions of multinationality, different value and performance indicators and a range 
of dataset specifications. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides an overview 
of related literature and develops our hypotheses. A description of our data, sampling procedures 
and methodology is given in Section 3. Section 4 provides a discussion and interpretation of our 
findings, including robustness/sensitivity checks, endogeneity controls and selection bias 
correction. Section 5 concludes and discusses implications. 
 
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
The broader question of how firm resources and heterogeneous or firm-specific characteristics 
enhance value and long-term performance has received considerable attention in economics and 
management research since Vernon (1966). Key to this question is the extent to which strategic 
investments and the multinational organizational form contribute to value creation. Debate on this 
fundamental issue is ongoing. To this day, there is no clear consensus on the nature of the 
relationship between multinationality and firm performance, or whether multinational and 
strategic investments unequivocally create long-term value for firms. Existing evidence tends to 
be circumstantial or conditional on method, measurement and theoretical perspective (e.g., Michel 
and Shaked, 1986; Tallman and Li, 1996). This is partly attributed to various alternative theories 
put forth to explain the economic and managerial motives behind strategic investments and related 
internationalization decisions, as well as the difficulty in reconciling competing arguments 
methodologically.  
The market power hypothesis (Bain, 1956; Hymer, 1976), for example, predicts that firms 
with large market shares and well-diversified products can earn supernormal returns and exercise 
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market power advantages in international markets. Internalization and transaction cost theories 
advocate that a key motive for firms’ expanding abroad is leveraging their intangible assets in a 
multinational context and minimizing transaction costs (Brouthers et al., 2008). Diversification 
arguments prescribe that going multinational is driven by risk reduction benefits and related 
business (segment) expansion considerations (Chang and Thomas, 1989; Anjos, 2010). 
Knowledge-based and organizational learning views assert that firms increase their foreign 
presence to enhance or capitalize on unique knowledge, innovation and organizational flexibility 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993). As a result of such complex and simultaneous linkages (and their 
potentially confounding effects), the value contribution of multinationality might also be partly 
attributable to management quality and skills (Hennart, 2007), firm heterogeneity, practices or 
other endogenous and moderating factors (Villalonga, 2004; Choi et al., 2014).  
Related empirical real options research examining the value and performance implications 
of multinationality is similarly inconclusive (Allen and Pantzalis, 1996; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000) 
as results appear mixed or context dependent (e.g., Pantzalis, 2001; Tong and Reuer, 2007; 
Driouchi and Bennett, 2011). Studies on strategic option effects also produce mixed or conditional 
findings (e.g., Reuer and Leiblein, 2000; Pantzalis, 2001; Tong et al., 2008a,b). The above 
evidence reinforces Hennart’s (2007) conjecture on the role of management and firm-specific 
characteristics in extracting value from multinational and strategic resources. What is missing from 
the extant empirical real options literature is an explicit recognition of the behavioral and specific 
factors that influence firms’ and managers’ ability to create, maintain and exercise (multinational) 
real options opportunities (Aabo et al., 2016; de Andres et al., 2017). Studying RO-AWN, as one 
key such factor, might thus help identify why some firms benefit significantly from 
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multinationality while others do not, and clarify when and how multinational flexibility and related 
investment decisions help increase firm value.  
 
2.1. Multinationality and firm value 
In terms of value creation mechanisms, multinationality enables firms to take advantage of growth 
and switch options that domestic counterparts cannot (Kogut, 1984). This is partly achieved 
through enhanced physical downside risk reduction and a better exploitation of upside 
opportunities (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Lee and Song, 2012). As a result of more changes in 
global factor market prices, exchange rate fluctuations and differential tax policies across 
countries, and therefore an increased need for multinational switching flexibility, the value of 
multinationality tends to increase with increased foreign presence and more countries of foreign 
operations (Allen and Pantzalis, 1996; Krapl, 2017). Thus we expect the more the alternative 
foreign operations choices within the multinational network, the greater the value conferred to the 
firm (Kogut, 1984; Trigeorgis, 1996).4 This leads to the following baseline hypothesis: 
 
H1: The higher a firm’s multinationality, the higher its value. 
 
2.2. Real options awareness and firm value creation 
Already established in the real options and management literature (Reuer and Leiblein, 2000; Tong 
et al., 2008a), the above baseline hypothesis serves as a platform for our subsequent real options-
based predictions on the value implications of multinational flexibility and real options. It does 
                                                 
4 As the number of countries with foreign subsidiaries rises, the correlation structure among alternative country 
operations within the MNC’s portfolio mix increases (becomes more positive), lowering the incremental switching 
option value of the MNC network. Also, organizational coordination costs increase with size and complexity and the 
marginal benefits likely decline, suggesting a logarithmic association.  
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not, however, in itself consider the role of management or real option practices in the value creation 
equation. While as hypothesized multinationality generates valuable growth potential and 
switching flexibility to be exploited by multinational firms, it is unclear how such potential and 
related shadow options are developed and turned into real value-creating real options resources. 
Accounting for RO-AWN should thus help clarify the link between multinational real options and 
the value creation process of the firm, as well as how much of the firm’s real options potential is 
actually realized by managers and their firms.  
Being part of firm intangible resources and know-how, RO-AWN should specifically help 
contribute to the three stages of activity underlying the real options value-creation process. These 
stages relate to: (1) how shadow options are identified and how staging or investment sequencing 
takes place under uncertainty (Bowman and Hurry, 1993); (2) how new information from internal 
firm operations or the international markets is interpreted and used as meaningful signals for real 
options exploitation (Bowman and Hurry, 1993); and (3) when and to what degree various 
categories of options are optimally exercised, extended or abandoned (Adner and Levinthal, 2004; 
Coff and Laverty, 2007).  
RO-AWN differs across firms partly because of path-dependent firm choices and practices, 
unique firm characteristics as well as heterogeneous access to resources facing market 
imperfections (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Barnett, 2005; Driouchi and Bennett, 2011). As a result 
of increased management attention, more theory-guided option development and exercise, and 
better integration and coordination of real options activities, high real options awareness can help 
bring more discipline and reduce biases across the above three decision-making stages, thus 
extracting more (realized) value from strategic investments and multinational flexibility. Due to 
limited visualization and representation of real option opportunities, agency problems and bounded 
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rationality (Coff and Laverty, 2007), relatively low or no awareness may result in behavioral biases 
such as escalation of commitment, inability to identify or structure options effectively, as well as 
biased, suboptimal or sometimes more costly option exercise decisions leading to missed real 
option potential and underperformance in one or more of the three stages.  
In terms of multinational flexibility, RO-AWN should help firms identify strategic and 
operating switch options in international business environments to cope with business uncertainty. 
Multinational shadow options can then be converted into flexible platforms exploited by MNCs 
for risk containment or opportunity exploitation purposes (Kogut, 1984; Bowman and Hurry, 
1993). This process involves flexible resource (re)allocation, organizational learning routines and 
development of skills and procedures for effective real option exploitation (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 
1994; Barnett, 2005). Managerial attention, sense-making, experience and intuition are key to 
these processes. The higher is RO-AWN within the firm, the more effective or likely is the 
integration of real-options related resources in multinational operating systems and policies, and 
the lower the costs and biases of maintaining and coordinating real options activities under 
incomplete information (Barnett, 2005; Coff and Laverty, 2007). By contrast, low RO-AWN results 
in higher organizational costs associated with coordination and option disposal or switch 
operations, and higher risk of ineffective or biased option exercise decisions due to agency and 
managerial cognition problems (Coff and Laverty, 2007). This suggests that multinational 
switching activities would be less effective with lower or no real options awareness, resulting in 
suboptimal, ill-timed or infrequent switching. Only when RO-AWN is high would the appraisal 
and monitoring of option exercise or switching decisions be disciplined and guided, and the 
likelihood of bias in option exercise be contained. Multinational switching should thus be more 
effective and valuable with high RO-AWN. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
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H2: The positive impact of multinationality on firm value is stronger for firms with 
higher real options awareness. 
 
In terms of direct value effects, RO-AWN can lead to long-term competitive advantages for MNCs 
due to a superior and holistic recognition, selection and management of real options, both 
operational and strategic. This can be achieved partly through retrospective sense-making and 
more active exploration of the real options bundle (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Li, 2007). Higher 
RO-AWN enables firms’ managers to be more conscious in recognizing the gap between potential 
and realized (or realizable) real options value (Barnett, 2005, 2008), to better manage the overall 
trade-off between flexibility and commitment (Coff and Laverty, 2007; Li, 2007), and to more 
effectively process opportunity arrival and expiration signals in jointly exercising multinational 
switching and other types of real option opportunities. Low RO-AWN results in suboptimal 
exploration and exploitation of such real options opportunities, more costly coordination of the 
broader real options resources, mis-investment problems and behavioral decision-making pitfalls 
(e.g., escalation of commitment or ambiguity aversion) along the staged option chain (Miller and 
Shapira, 2004; Coff and Laverty, 2007). Without the awareness specificity, firms might also 
overlook important shadow options and miss taking crucial strategic positions for adaptability and 
core competence development (Barnett, 2005, 2008). Only when RO-AWN is high will the option 
realization process be complete, managers can act effectively on the aforementioned information 
signals, and the link between strategic action and firm value creation can be strong (Bowman and 
Hurry, 1993; Barnett, 2005, 2008). Managerial and market perceptions of option values are thus 
more (less) close when RO-AWN is high (low). As a result of superior attention and induced real 
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options know-how, firms with the high awareness specificity can generate differential or excess 
returns. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
  
H3: The higher the degree of real options awareness, the higher the firm’s value. 
 
3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample description 
Our sample consists of all U.S. listed (non-financial) multinational firms during the ten-year period 
1996-2005. Characterized by a number of turbulent events and changes in economic fundamentals, 
especially in the 1996-2002 period (collapse of LTCM, Russia’s sovereign default, Asian financial 
crisis, and the dot-com crisis), this volatile period serves well our purpose of testing ROT 
predictions on multinational flexibility and real options effects. To construct our panel dataset, we 
used financial, market and fundamental information on all 1539 U.S. listed international firms 
(excluding financial institutions) with publicly available data in the Compustat disc platform over 
the period 1996-2005. Negative equity firms were omitted because of their different growth and 
real options characteristics compared to those of going-concern counterparts. The resulting 1389 
firms were separated into aware and unaware firms for comparison. Data on multinationality were 
collected from the International Directory of Corporate Affiliations of LexisNexis, Compact 
Disclosure data platform and the submitted financial statements of firms obtained from the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Our comprehensive sampling approach allows 
studying performance and growth option effects across size, industry, multinationality and RO-
AWN groups. 
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Hand-collected RO-AWN data were obtained through content analysis of real options 
diffusion documented in the public domain, such as the popular press (e.g., the Economist, 
Financial Times, CFO Magazine etc.),5 related practice-oriented academic literature (e.g., 
Bowman and Moscowitz, 2001; Triantis and Borison, 2001; De Neufville, 2003), reports from 
related consulting services firms (e.g., the Real Options Group, Decisioneering, Palisade, 
Deloitte), managerial sections of company reports (e.g., Schlumberger, Petrobras, Philips), and 
secondary data from the International Real Options Conference database. Our data collection 
procedure is in line with prior accounting and financial management research on the use of 
valuation models by analysts (e.g., Bradshaw, 2002; Demirakos et al., 2004), firms’ derivatives 
use, and recommendations of stock market analysts research (Breton and Taffler, 2001). We follow 
the content analysis methodology to study evidence of real options practice in industry and identify 
firms with the awareness specificity. Confirming the existence of a cluster of managerially aware 
firms, the above sources were subjected to further analysis whereby aware firms were categorized 
according to the strength of real options activity or diffusion evidence and references to the real 
options logic in the relevant documents. Firms with stronger evidence of real options activity or 
actual use were classified in the “high” awareness group. Specifically, when evidence of use, 
application and real options activity/diffusion was clear and/or confirmed by multiple sources, the 
firm was categorized in the high awareness group, otherwise it was placed in the lower awareness 
group. Examples of companies in the high awareness category include: Amgen, Anadarko, BP, 
Philips, Lilly, Cable & Wireless, BHP and Chevron (e.g., Borissiouk and Peli, 2001; Lint and 
Pennings, 2001; Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2001; Trigeorgis, 2005; Amram et al., 2006). Firms with 
weak evidence or with limited attendance to real options conferences or workshops were 
                                                 
5 This adoption activity dates back to the mid-1990s (Business Week, 1999; CFO Europe, 1999; Trigeorgis, 1999; 
CFO Magazine, 2003; De Neufville, 2003).  
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considered of “low” awareness. Firms in this category included AstraZeneca, British Gas, Bristol-
Myers Squibb and Sun Microsystems among others. Firms with no evidence of real options activity 
from the above information sources were categorized as “unaware” of real options. Separate and 
independent assessments were conducted by each of the authors for this specific data gathering 
and categorization procedure. The samples resulting from these evaluations were compatible in 
terms of composition. Additional examples of firms with high awareness included Merk, Boeing, 
Shell, Rio Tinto, Petrobras and Serono, among others (e.g., Cornelius et al., 2004; Smit and 
Trigeorgis, 2004; Mathews et al., 2007). The overall number of firms (158 MNCs) identified as 
aware of real options is consistent with survey evidence on the practice of real options among 
Fortune corporations (8-10% adoption overall) (see Ryan and Ryan, 2002).  
The awareness data gathering involved obtaining documented evidence on real options 
practice and industry applications (e.g., Kemna (1993) on Shell; Billigton et al. (2001) on HP; 
Keefer (2004) on Sprint), factual evidence of real options adoption (e.g., Nichols (1994) on 
Merck), concrete evidence of managers’ interest in the real options methodology (Ryan and Ryan, 
2002; Busby and Pitts, 1997; Graham and Harvey, 2001), evidence of real options consulting 
activity (e.g., PwC, Deloitte), evidence of attendance at executive workshops and conferences 
(e.g., Decisioneering, the Real Options Group), and use of real options logic and terminology in 
the managerial sections of company reports (e.g., Petrobras, Boeing, Motorola, Philips). A list of 
165 documented real options aware (RO-AWN) firms, of which 158 are MNCs, resulted from this 
data collection procedure. This sample is 56% larger than that of Driouchi and Bennett (2011) who 
study downside risk in the case of 101 large managerially aware multinational corporations. Using 
the published evidence and our content-based categorization, 72 firms were deemed to be of “high” 
real options awareness (HRO-AWN) while 93 were considered of “low” RO-AWN (LRO-AWN). 
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These two subsets are roughly of comparable size and the resulting subsamples are deemed largely 
free from statistical imbalance.6 We address potential self-selection bias and endogeneity issues 
by performing a battery of statistical and robustness tests, including 2SLS regressions, subsample 
analyses, propensity matching and Heckman two-stage procedure (see e.g., Park et al., 2013 and 
Mishra, 2014). 
 
3.2. Variables specification and statistical methods 
To investigate the validity of our main hypotheses, we use proxies for multinationality (MULTI) 
and real options awareness (RO-AWN) and examine their joint impact and interactions on long-
term firm value and performance as measured by Tobin’s Q, return-on-assets (ROA) and the firm’s 
three-year average stock returns (AvgStkRtn). We also control for future-oriented growth options 
(GO) as well as changes in growth options (ΔGO). These two constructs have been used in prior 
real options research dealing with firm valuation and stock returns (e.g., Trigeorgis and 
Lambertides, 2014).  We additionally control for other standard firm characteristics, such as 
systematic risk (beta, β), investment growth (INVG), size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), industry effects 
(IND) and endogeneity. We include structural fixed-year effects in our longitudinal sample.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Because of the relative rarity of real options practice in firms (lack of systematic use) and the rather weak evidence 
of real options attention in industry (e.g., Ryan and Ryan, 2002), we employed content analysis to infer the relative 
degrees of awareness in our sample (see e.g., Holsti, 1968). Using various sources, we obtained a representative sample 
of aware firms producing a procedure for categorization. This was aimed to capture the heterogeneity in real options 
practice among MNCs and serves our purpose of contrasting the value determinants of aware firms with those of less 
or non-aware counterparts. The list is available from the authors upon request. 
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3.2.1. Dependent variable(s) 
We measure long-term firm value and performance using the annual Tobin’s Q ratio (Qi,t) for each 
firm i (e.g., Frijns et al., 2016). Tobin’s Q is calculated by dividing the market value of a firm’s 
assets (measured as market value of outstanding equity plus book value of debt) by its replacement 
cost proxied by the firm’s book assets. By using Tobin’s Q, issues of estimating rates of return or 
marginal costs are avoided. For further validation and robustness, we also employ the firm’s 
forward return on assets (ROA) and the average stock returns (AvgStkRtn) over three years as 
alternative indicators of long-term value and performance.  
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
Our first main explanatory variable, the degree of real options awareness (RO-AWN), represents a 
key construct in the relationship between multinational real options resources and firm value. It 
aims to capture the extent to which real options potential is realized by firms and their managers. 
We posit that RO-AWN is a crucial behavioral link between real options exercise or exploitation 
and firm value creation as it can have significant moderating effects arising from heterogeneity. 
Based on the categorization procedure described above, variable RO-AWN is estimated as the 
natural logarithm of 1 plus the value weight of its awareness group: group (a) “no awareness” has 
a weight of 0, group (b) “low” awareness has a weight of 1, and group (c) “high” awareness a 
weight of 2. The higher the real option awareness of a firm, the higher its RO-AWN score. Firms 
with no (evidence of) real options awareness get a RO-AWN value of zero. An alternative 
specification of RO-AWN using dummy variables is also adopted to account for the specific effects 
of high and low awareness. 
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Multinationality (MULTI), our second key explanatory variable, reflects the diversity and 
breadth of a firm’s global activities. As standard in the literature on international scope (e.g., Allen 
and Pantzalis, 1996; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000), multinationality is measured as the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the number (M) of foreign countries in which the firm has operating 
subsidiaries (MULTI = ln(1+M)). This specification is also indicative of multinational shifting 
abilities across a broader network of subsidiaries. It may further capture the marginal declining 
benefits of multinationality (see e.g., Aabo et al., 2016). For additional robustness, we use the 
percentages of foreign sales (FS), foreign assets (FA) and foreign operating income (FOI) as 
alternative MULTI specifications. Throughout the paper, we focus primarily on ln (1+M) and 
foreign sales (FS) as our main proxies for multinationality. 
Besides the above main variables, we include other real options-related independent factors 
to control for firm strategic characteristics. Strategic growth options (GOi,t-1) represents the prior 
infrastructural capabilities the firm has put in place (at t-1) to create strategic growth opportunities. 
Its measurement (e.g., see Trigeorgis and Lambertides, 2014) involves regressing a number of 
option-related independent variables on growth option values (see also Kester, 1984; Cooper, 
Gulen and Schill, 2008), estimating the model parameters on recent 3-year industry data and using 
the estimated coefficients and current firm data to obtain a predicted GO score for each firm i at 
time t (see eq. (3)). In addition to the level of strategic growth options (predicted GO score), ΔGOi,t  
is also included to capture recent enhancement (change) in  growth option value and not confound 
investment growth effects.  
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3.2.3. Control variables 
We employ a number of standard control variables from the literature on firm value and returns. 
Each firm i’s market or systematic risk, beta (βi,t-1), is estimated over the previous 36 months using 
the Sharpe-Lintner model (CAPM) as in Fama and French (1992). Firm size (SIZEi,t-1) is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the book value of firm i’s total assets in the previous period. Investment 
growth (INVG) is measured by change in firm capital expenditures. It is estimated as the (three-
year period) average capital expenditure at year-end minus the beginning-of-period one, deflated 
by beginning-of-year total assets. Leverage (LEVi,t-1) is measured in market value terms as the 
natural logarithm of total liabilities divided by fiscal year-end firm value (V = ME + LT) at time 
t-1. INDi,t equals the median performance of the industry firm i operates in, used to capture industry 
effects. Fixed effects are used to capture time variation accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
at the firm level and capturing effects of economy-wide variations or other unobserved factors. 
Independent and control variables are lagged to mitigate potential problems of reverse causality 
and endogeneity. Variables INVG and ΔGO are not lagged as they represent changes. IND is used 
to capture industry effects within the same period and is not lagged. Control variables are listed in 
the second line of eq. (1) below. 
 
3.2.4. Model specification and analytical procedure 
We specify and test the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) multivariate model using panel 
data: 
 
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1*i t i t i t i t i t i t i tV a bMULTI cROAWN dGO g GO hMULTI ROAWN            
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ,*i t i t i t i t i t i t i t im nSIZE pLEV qSIZE LEV rINVG uIND e                                 (1)
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where 7 
, : firm 's value and performance measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and AvgStkRtn at time ,i tV i t  
, 1 :  firm 's degree of multinationality at time 1,i tMULTI i t   
, 1 :  firm 's degree of real options awareness at time 1,i tROAWN i t   
, 1 :  firm 's preexisting level of strategic growth options at time 1,i tGO i t   
, :  firm 's change in strategic growth options in year ,i tGO i t  
, 1 , 1* :  firm 's interaction term between multinationality and ROAWN at time 1,i t i tMULTI ROAWN i t    
 , 1 : firm 's systematic risk beta  at time 1,i t i t    
 , 1 :  firm 's size total assets  at time 1,i tSIZE i t   
, 1 :  firm 's leverage at time 1,i tLEV i t   
, 1 , 1* :  firm 's interaction term between size and leverage at time 1,i t i tSIZE LEV i t    
 , :  firm 's capital investment growth increase in CAPEX  in year ,i tINVG i t  
, :  firm 's median industry performance level at time .i tIND i t  
 
MULTI, RO-AWN and GO are endogenous variables in eq. (1) as they are influenced by other 
primary market factors and firm-specific characteristics. We follow a two-stage statistical 
procedure (2SLS) where predicted values of multinationality, awareness, and growth options from 
the first stage are used as determinants of value and performance in the second-stage analysis.  
 
                                                 
7 In the first-stage regression MULTI is instrumented by market concentration, intangibles, firm-specific volatility, 
R&D intensity (RD) with controls for prior performance, prior size and prior level of multinationality; the predicted 
value of MULTI is then used in the second-stage regression. In the first-stage regression RO-AWN is instrumented by 
prior performance, prior size and prior level of multinationality, with the predicted value of RO-AWN then used in the 
second-stage regression. 
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3.2.5. First- and second-stage regressions  
Multinationality endogenous effects are tackled using four instruments (market concentration, 
intangibles, firm-specific volatility, and R&D intensity) and three control variables (past 
performance, prior multinationality and prior size). The firm’s market power and ability to exploit 
shared growth options relative to competition for a given industrial structure is proxied by market 
concentration (MCON), measured as the square root of the firm’s Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) if the firm has above-average Tobin’s Q, and zero if the firm has below-average Q. 
Intangibles (INTANG) are measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets. Firm-specific volatility (VOLAT) is estimated from the standard deviation (σ) of firm 
i’s equity returns based on the past 36 monthly stock returns. R&D intensity (RD) is calculated 
using the natural logarithm of the ratio of R&D expenses to sales for each firm. Following previous 
studies on the drivers of multinationality (e.g., Tong and Reuer, 2007; Grubaugh, 1987), we test 
the following first-stage model:  
 
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1i t i t i t i t i t i t i tMULTI a bMCON cINTANG dVOLAT eRD gMULTI hSIZE                            
(2) 
where 
, 1 :  firm 's market concentration at time 1,i tMCON i t   
, 1 :  firm 's intangible assets at time 1,i tINTANG i t   
, 1 :  firm-specific volatility or business uncertainty for firm  in year 1,i tVOLAT i t   
 , 1 :  firm 's research and development R & D  intensity at time 1,i tRD i t   
, 1 :  firm 's multinationality index at time 1,i tMULTI i t   
 , 1 :  firm 's size natural logarithm of total assets  at time 1.i tSIZE i t   
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We also account for past performance via lagged ROA or Q in our first-stage regressions.  
RO-AWN is predicted using firm characteristics such as past performance (ROAi,t-1 or 
Tobin’s Qi,t-1), multinationality (MULTIi,t-1), and firm size (SIZEi,t-1) in the first-stage regressions. 
The predicted value of RO-AWN is then used in our second-stage procedure.8 In future research 
and using ExecuComp data, we intend to examine the behavioral and governance antecedents of 
RO-AWN and how they might affect firm characteristics. Estimation of our growth options control 
variable (GO) follows the below dynamics (see Trigeorgis and Lambertides (2014) for theoretical 
arguments and variable specification): 
 
GO = f(idio. volatility, return skewness, leverage, organizational slack, cash flow position, R&D 
intensity, cumulative sales growth, market power, fixed effects, industry effects, interactions)       (3)   
                                  
We ran our second-stage multivariate panel data regressions based on (all or parts of) eq. 
(1) using the predicted values for MULTI, RO-AWN and GO. Standard statistical and robustness 
tests (z-statistics and model Wald Chi-square) are reported in Tables 4-7 and discussed in the 
following section. As a market-based valuation measure, Tobin’s Q should immediately reflect the 
positive impact on firm value of our main explanatory variables (MULTI and RO-AWN). As a 
measure of profitability and operating performance, ROA should also reflect the positive 
implications of RO-AWN in MNCs. The same holds for the 3-year average stock return used as 
another indicator of long-term firm performance.  
                                                 
8 The explanatory variables in the basic model (INVG, β, etc.) are excluded from the first-stage regressions as they do 
not affect the instrumented/endogenous variables in a statistically significant way. This is valid econometrically since 
at least one explanatory variable of the basic model is included in the first stage model. To mitigate model 
identification problems, the Kleibergen-Paap and Stock-Yogo tests were conducted. The under identification and weak 
identification hypotheses were rejected, reassuring that our first-stage models are well identified. We also tested for 
issues of over identification and instrumental variable relevance in our models using the Sargan-Anderson likelihood 
and Hansen-J econometric procedures; outcomes from these tests confirm quality instruments were used. 
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for our overall sample of 1389 firms. Panel B 
compares the characteristics of aware firms (RO-AWN) and manufacturing multinational firms 
(MANUFACTURING) against those of the overall sample (ALL). The median firm in the overall 
sample (ALL) has a size of $15,694 m (= exp(9.66)), a Tobin’s Q of 1.56, a growth options (GO) 
score of 0.16, and a foreign sales (FS) ratio of 0.26 (the mean firm 0.29). The median aware firm 
has a comparable Tobin’s Q (1.52) as the median MNC in the sample (1.56), similar ROA and GO 
ratios but higher average stock returns. RO-AWN firms have foreign subsidiaries in 12 countries 
on average (with the median firm in 14 countries). Manufacturing MNCs have subsidiaries in 13 
countries and a higher foreign sales ratio (0.31).  Panel C shows the specific distribution of our 
sample of RO-AWN firms, with low vs. high real options awareness across various economic 
sectors. In terms of number of firms, the Manufacturing sector (54) and Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals (27) exhibit the greatest awareness, followed by the Natural Resources and 
Energy sectors. In terms of industry concentration, Chemical and Pharmaceuticals (17%) and 
Electricity and Energy (15%) MNCs display the highest awareness.  
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for our instrumental, explanatory and control 
variables. There is no clear evidence of serial correlation or multicollinearity (VIFs < 5). Besides 
size (which exhibits some correlation with several variables), the only relatively strong (positive) 
correlation is observed between multinationality (MULTI) and RO-AWN.  This motivates the 
inclusion of an interaction term (MULTI*RO-AWN) and the consideration of endogenous factors 
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in our panel data analysis. In line with Aabo et al. (2016) and for further robustness, we also control 
for potentially confounding size effects in our analysis through residual-based indicators of 
multinationality. 
                                            ---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
4.1. Regression findings 
First-stage results. We first discuss our first-stage regression results on the drivers of 
multinationality, real options awareness, and strategic growth options. Results are summarized in 
Table 3. Panel A suggests that past size and market concentration can increase the likelihood of 
going multinational; this effect is stronger when domestic firms are added to the sample. In line 
with real options predictions, high business volatility (VOLAT) increases the likelihood of 
expanding or coordinating business activities abroad. Intangibles (INTANG) also appear to be a 
significant determinant of multinationality. R&D intensity (RD) is loosely (positively) associated 
with multinationality. Finally, past performance (ROA or Q) and prior degree of multinationality 
are significantly positively related to next period’s multinationality. Regarding the determinants 
of RO-AWN, Panel B confirms that past size, prior multinationality and lagged performance are 
significantly associated with RO-AWN, underlining the role of such firm-specific factors in real 
options awareness building. In terms of growth option (GO) determinants, Panel C shows that 
idiosyncratic volatility, firm return skewness (SKEW), R&D intensity (RD), cumulative sales 
growth (SG), organizational slack (SGA) and market power (HHI) are all positively associated with 
firm strategic growth options, in line with Trigeorgis and Lambertides (2014). Leverage (LEV) and 
cash flow coverage (CFC) are negatively associated with GO in line with Aabo et al. (2016). CFC 
is significant only when the GO model (eq. (3)) is implemented on the universe of all US-listed 
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firms. These first-stage results serve as the basis for our second-stage regressions, which take into 
account endogeneity and self-selection issues.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
Second-stage results. The results of the second-stage panel data regressions analyzing 
long-term firm value and performance as measured by Tobin’s Q are shown in Table 4 Panel A. 
Results using ROA and average stock returns as alternative dependent variables are shown in Table 
4 Panel B. The upper part of Table 4 Panel A shows the impact of our main variables MULTI and 
RO-AWN (and their interaction) on Tobin’s Q; the next parts shows GO and GO effects; the lower 
part considers the control factors. Model 0 reports the impact of the control variables, including 
business volatility, on firm value. Models 1, 1’ and 1’’ describe the incremental univariate impact 
of multinationality (MULTI), real options awareness (RO-AWN), and the joint GO and ΔGO 
variables alone, given the control variables. Models 2 and 2’ present multivariate results with the 
main variables MULTI and RO-AWN first alone and then controlling for GO and ΔGO. Model 3 
reports the combined effects of MULTI, RO-AWN, GO and ΔGO, along with the interaction term 
MULTI*RO-AWN on Tobin’s Q while controlling for other effects. Table 4 Panel B summarizes 
ROA- and AvgStkRtn-related results using the specifications of Models 2’ and 3. Significance 
levels for all models are determined using standard z-tests, with the corresponding z-statistics 
shown in parenthesis below each coefficient along with an indication of significance level. 
Adjusted overall R2 and model Wald Chi-square statistics, along with Model rho, are shown at the 
bottom of each column.  
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 Panel A about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
The significance of the control variables in Table 4 Panel A is generally in line with prior 
research. Business volatility, measured by the standard deviation of stock returns, has a positive 
and significant effect on firm value in Model 0. This is consistent with ROT predictions on the 
mediating role of real options in the volatility-value relationship and validates our use of business 
volatility as a driver of multinationality in subsequent Models 1-3. Models 1, 1’ and 2 in Panel A 
show that MULTI and RO-AWN, individually and jointly, have significant positive effects on 
Tobin’s Q (beyond the control variables). This is in line with our theoretical predictions and 
provides support for hypotheses H1 and H3: multinationality and real options awareness increase 
firm value beyond standard determinants (p < 0.01). Comparing coefficients in Model 2, the 
positive effect of RO-AWN on Tobin’s Q appears to be stronger than its MULTI counterpart. Most 
of the control variables retain their signs when adding MULTI and RO-AWN (or both) to the 
models.9  Outcomes from Models 1’’ and 2’ also show that growth options (GO) as well as positive 
changes (ΔGO) are associated with higher (positive) value. This is in line with growth options-
related theories and recent evidence from Trigeorgis and Lambertides (2014). The positive effects 
of MULTI and RO-AWN on firm value are maintained after including growth options factors in the 
regressions.10 Similar patterns are observed in Model 2’ in Table 4 Panel B. Hypotheses 1 and 3 
are, therefore, also valid for alternative indicators of firm value and performance. Finally, Model 
3 in Table 4 Panel A indicates that the positive impact of multinationality is enhanced through its 
                                                 
9 The association between leverage and Tobin’s Q is significant negative. This may be because well-performing firms 
enjoy a higher market value of equity (lowering the leverage ratio measured in market value terms) or profitable firms 
can raise more funds from internal sources, needing less external funds to borrow. 
10 In terms of economic significance, the positive contribution of GO to firm value is more important than that of 
MULTI. 
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interaction with RO-AWN. This provides support for Hypothesis 2 on the moderating role of RO-
AWN in the relationship between multinationality and firm value. Multinationality in conjunction 
with real options awareness can increase Tobin’s Q by up to 0.95 (0.164+0.715*ln(3)). This impact 
is economically significant and large in comparison to the mean Tobin’s Q of 2.28. The direct 
positive effect of multinationality on performance is maintained when including the interaction 
term MULTI*RO-AWN in the regressions. This further corroborates H1. It is noteworthy that, on 
its own, MULTI becomes insignificant when accounting for distress effects and adding negative 
equity firms to our MNCs sample (unreported). This is line with extant evidence and highlights 
the role of firm-specific characteristics in the multinationality-value equation (see e.g., Aabo et al., 
2016). After controlling for size, specific characteristics and real options determinants, MULTI 
appears to increase value only for firms without negative equity and that are unlikely to be 
distressed. In other words, multinational flexibility is useful for firms if they have the required 
financial resources to exercise and exploit their real options (see also Aabo et al., 2016). The 
moderating effect of RO-AWN on multinationality is maintained across both samples (with and 
without negative equity firms), further corroborating H2.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 Panel B about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
Table 4 Panel B reports findings for Models 2’ and 3 using alternative indicators of value 
and performance. Results are very similar. Multinationality (MULTI) and RO-AWN, individually 
and jointly, have positive and significant net effects on performance as measured by AvgStkRtn 
and ROA (we report Log (1+ Tobin’s Q) results for comparison) (Models 2’).11  MULTI*RO-AWN 
in Model 3 is also positive and significant. In terms of economic significance, multinationality in 
                                                 
11 Similar conclusions are found when ME is used as an alternative dependent variable. 
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conjunction with real options awareness can potentially increase AvgStkRtn and ROA by up to 
12.7% and 5.3%, respectively. These results provide further robust evidence in support of 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 concerning a significant positive (indirect and direct) role of RO-AWN in 
enhancing long-term firm value via multinationality and its related real options flexibility benefits. 
Accounting for endogeneity, alternative theories of the firm and heterogeneity in real options 
practice, our models confirm that multinationality increases firm value, on its own and in 
interaction with real options awareness, in our sample of 1389 firms.12  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
Table 5 revisits the above conclusions using alternative definitions and measures of 
multinationality in Model 3. These include the raw number of countries in which the firm has 
foreign operating subsidiaries (ln (1+M)), and the firm’s foreign sales (FS), foreign assets (FA), 
and foreign operating income (FOI) ratios. In line with Aabo et al. (2016), for robust inference and 
additional validation we also report residuals-based specifications of multinationality after 
controlling for size effects. Though Table 5 presents findings for all four alternative proxies for 
comparison, throughout the rest paper we focus on the multinationality implications of ln (1+M) 
and FS only. The findings in Table V corroborate the role of size in the multinationality-
performance equation (e.g., FA and FOI are positive and significant only after being “cleaned” 
from size effects) and also confirm our predictions on the moderating effect of RO-AWN on the 
relationship between multinationality and firm value, besides the direct positive effects of RO-
AWN and MULTI (p < 0.01). MULTI and MULTI*RO-AWN are consistently positive and 
                                                 
12Joint tests were conducted to verify if our explanatory variables are altogether jointly statistically significant. Results 
confirm that our explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant supporting the validity and strength of our 
models. 
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significant across all specifications, once again validating our hypotheses and theoretical 
predictions. For example, we find that a one unit increase in RO-AWN is associated with an 
addition of 14.5% in the firm’s performance sensitivity to changes in the residual foreign sales 
ratio. These findings suggest that highly aware firms might be more opportunity-exploitation 
driven or downside risk protective in terms of multinational switching and physical hedging 
capabilities (see e.g., Aabo and Simkins, 2005). RO-AWN firms also seem to enhance value from 
multinational real options, strengthening competitive advantage directly through real options 
awareness.13  
Our main finding from Tables 4 and 5 is that firms that are aware of their real options are 
able to create more value from multinational switching flexibility and foreign sales infrastructure. 
It appears these multinational firms are more successful in managing some of the organizational 
and learning processes associated with their corporate real options (involving option identification, 
integration, maintenance, exercise and disposal) than their non-aware counterparts. The above 
likely entails: 1) the recognition and staging of (multinational) shadow option opportunities, 2) 
better processing of information and uncertainty signals, and 3) more effective exercise and 
coordination of real options resources across the multinational network.  RO-AWN is in effect a 
proxy for more effective real options decision making within the MNC (manifesting managerial 
quality), in line with Hennart’s (2007) conjecture and our earlier predictions that management 
skills, heterogeneous characteristics and practices can contribute to competitive advantage and 
value creation differentially across firms and borders. Overall, RO-AWN firms are more effective 
at managing their multinational investment decisions, narrowing the gap between real option 
                                                 
13 In terms of other standard real option effects, we find the interaction of MULTI and GO to be negatively associated 
with firm value, confirming the non-additive interaction effects of multiple options (Trigeorgis, 1993). We also find 
a negative relation between RO-AWN and GO, suggesting that managerially aware firms may have already exploited 
much of their growth potential. This accords with the predictions of Bernardo and Chowdry (2002). 
  
 
29 
 
potential and realized option value. The next section discusses further robustness checks and 
additional findings. 
 
4.2. Further robustness checks, selection bias correction and additional findings 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 Panel A about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
Our results are robust to a range of alternative dataset or measurement specifications, summarized 
in Table 6 Panels A and B. In Table 6 Panel A, Multinationality - measured by the number of 
countries with foreign operations or with the foreign sales ratio - is consistently positively related 
to firm value, both on its own and via the interaction term MULTI*RO-AWN, in line with previous 
findings reported in Tables 4 and 5. This holds for our “all MNCs” sample (Specification 1), as 
well as for a sample composed exclusively of manufacturing MNCs (Specification 2). 
Specification (3) shows similar robustness results after excluding smaller firms from the sample. 
Specifications (4) and (5) use alternative definitions of RO-AWN, based on subsample analysis 
(dummy variables), first defined as a single dummy variable (0 non-aware, 1 aware) and then 
second without the logarithmic transformation (A = 0, 1, 2).14 Results are broadly comparable to 
those of the benchmark model. We also verify whether our line of reasoning for RO-AWN holds 
for investment growth (INVG) and operating options, and find that real options awareness tends to 
enhance the positive effect of INVG on firm value (p < 0.1) (Specification 6). This suggests that 
managers of aware firms are also better at utilizing and managing their capital investments (past 
growth options turned into assets in place and operating options) and in balancing the trade-off 
                                                 
14 The impact of low RO-AWN is positive but insignificant in the second-stage regressions, suggesting that superficial 
knowledge without broader organizational capabilities may not be sufficient to ensure superior performance. We find 
also that the interaction term MULTI*RO-AWN*SIZE is significant and positive, highlighting the structuring features 
of real option management in large firms. 
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between exploitation and exploration than non-aware counterparts.15 The above findings and 
conclusions are robust to alternative indicators of firm value and performance (AvgStkRtn and 
ROA), as shown in Table 6 Panel B. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 Panel B about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
Table 7 reports robustness test comparisons after controlling for self-selection, small sample bias 
and endogeneity issues using Heckman (1979) and propensity score matching techniques 
(Rosenbaum and Robin, 1983) on both MULTI and RO-AWN.16 These procedures necessitate 
considering domestic firms (without negative equity) in our dataset. The coefficients of the main 
model corrected for selectivity bias under the Heckman method are shown in the third and fourth 
columns of Table 7. The results are generally consistent with our panel 2SLS findings (shown for 
comparison in the first two columns) indicating that self-selection bias is not a major issue. 
Multinationality in itself appears positive and significant for FS confirming H1 (MULTI as ln 
(1+M) is also significant when omitting the dominant MULTI*RO-AWN effect from the 
regression), and is exhibiting a beneficial influence on firm value in interaction with RO-AWN as 
predicted by H2. H3 on the direct effect of RO-AWN on performance is also supported under 
MULTI and FS specifications. To address further the relatively small size of the RO-AWN dataset 
and control for endogeneity, propensity score matching is implemented in Specification 3 of Table 
                                                 
15 In a sample extension, we find that the positive effects of multinationality and real options awareness on long-term 
value and performance could also hold for domestic and multinational (manufacturing) firms (excluding negative 
equity). However, more RO-AWN data for domestic firms would be needed to corroborate this claim. Our Heckman 
and propensity regressions in Table 7 attempt to partly address this issue. 
16 Our two-stage Heckman and propensity procedures also consider domestic firms (without negative equity) in the 
analysis. The two-stage Heckman method was originally employed on cross-sectional data. It was extended by 
Heckman on panel data (see Wooldrige, 1995). Applications include Tong and Reuer (2007) and Chung et al. (2010). 
See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for technical details on the propensity score matching procedure and Villalonga 
(2004) on the application of this procedure to the diversification discount.  
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7. The last two columns (Columns 5-6) of Table 7 present our propensity score findings based on 
MULTI and RO-AWN criteria. The overall conclusions regarding our main explanatory variables 
also hold under the propensity score matching approach. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
Our overall conclusion, based on all above robustness procedures and additional statistical tests 
accounting for a variety of issues (endogeneity, selection-bias, alternative sample and 
measurement specifications, fixed-year and industry effects), is that multinationality can enhance 
long-term firm value. This positive effect is more pronounced in the presence of real options 
awareness, such that RO-AWN and management quality can be sources of competitive advantage 
especially for less financially constrained MNCs.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Our study offers important insights into the value implications of real options management in U.S. 
listed non-financial international firms. It highlights the role of firm practices and real options 
awareness as a key heterogeneity factor affecting the link between multinationality and real options 
with long-term firm value creation. We focus on firm value and performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q, return-on-assets and 3-year average stock returns and examine related determinants, such as 
growth options and multinational switching flexibility under a unified and comprehensive 
explanatory framework. Controlling for structural real options and other firm characteristics, we 
isolate the moderating effect of real options awareness on the multinationality-value relationship, 
underlining the process of real options-based decision making and potentially the role of 
management quality in multinational organizations. We find that aware firms are better able to 
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manage their multinational switching flexibility and utilize their capital investment than their 
unaware counterparts. This finding is in line with the management theory predictions of Bowman 
and Hurry (1993), Barnett (2005) and Coff and Laverty (2007) on the role of management in real 
options integration, maintenance, exercise and disposal. Our paper is novel in empirically studying 
such managerial process dynamics together by examining real options and multinational flexibility 
effects concurrently, and in assessing the role of firm heterogeneity in the form of real options 
awareness in long-term firm value creation. Our extensive findings help clarify important 
questions on the pertinence of real options in corporate strategy. They call for further research that 
goes beyond the concept of real options reasoning to also consider behavioral, structural and 
infrastructural aspects of real options management in corporate finance and decision making. 
Future research could investigate the antecedents of real options awareness in firms across 
countries and industries and link them to firm characteristics and other performance outcomes. 
Resulting implications of our findings for management are rather evident. Firms should 
invest in knowledge acquisition and management quality building and develop organizational real 
options capabilities and infrastructure to effectively exploit the benefits of flexibility in strategic 
investment and operating/switching decisions. This specifically concerns the three stages of 
activity underlying the real options logic: 1) option identification and staging, 2) option integration 
and information signalling, 3) exercise and exploitation of flexible firm resources. Each stage 
performance can be improved with increased real options attention and good management of 
financial resources. This should enable more effective planning, structuring and managing of an 
MNC’s network of operations to take better advantage of changes in input prices, labor costs, 
demand or exchange fluctuations and other global or environmental factors. Organizations need to 
develop flexible systems and management practices to proactively deal and cope with uncertainty, 
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and to more effectively manage and exercise their corporate real options (e.g., expand, scale-down, 
switch, extend, contract and abandon) while containing behavioral biases and coordination costs 
associated with implementing the real options logic. Real options awareness and a flexible 
multinational infrastructure may equip organizations with the necessary decision apparatus to 
benefit from fluctuations or return differentials in global markets. When real options are identified 
and exploited or exercised appropriately through increased awareness, enhanced long-term value 
and performance are likely to follow. Acquiring the necessary knowledge, through training, skills 
development and managerial learning, and putting in place adequate infrastructure and practices 
to responsibly enhance real options awareness in large organizations should be a priority on 
managers’ agendas in these times of heightened global uncertainty.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the overall and specific subsamples 
Panel A. Overall sample (ALL) (N = 1389) 
 
The overall sample consists of 1389 multinational firms (non-negative equity) listed in the Compustat database during 1996-
2005. 165 firms were classified as real options aware; 158 were MNCs. Tobin´s Q: the ratio of the market value of a firm’s 
assets (measured by the market value of its outstanding equity and the book value of its debt) to its replacement cost (firm’s 
book value of assets), ROA: forward average return-on-assets over three years, AvgStkRtn: average stock returns over three 
years. RO-AWN: degree of real options awareness, MULTI: degree of multinationality (countries), FS: foreign sales ratio, 
GO: strategic growth options measured as {GO = f (idiosyncratic volatility, skewness, organizational slack, cash flow 
coverage, cumulative sales growth, market power, R&D intensity)}. INVG: the change in capital expenditures, β: beta 
calculated based on 36 monthly returns, SIZE: measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, LEV: leverage measured by 
(the natural logarithm of) total liabilities divided by firm market value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median S.D.
Tobin's Q 2.279 1.563 2.166
ROA 0.044 0.043 0.098
AvgStkRtn 0.174 0.126 0.504
RO-AWN 0.886 0.693 0.203
MULTI 2.704 2.833 1.213
FS 0.295 0.260 0.215
GO 0.118 0.159 0.690
INVG 0.132 0.073 0.188
β 1.103 1.043 0.670
SIZE 9.713 9.661 1.376
LEV -1.121 -0.915 0.809
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Panel B. Specific subsamples 
 
RO-AWN is the subsample of aware MNCs (N = 158), MANUFACTURING is the subsample of manufacturing MNCs (N = 712), 
ALL is the overall sample presented for comparison (similar to Panel A). 
 
 
Panel C. Distribution of aware firms (RO-AWN) by industry and across sectors 
 
 
 
 
Variable RO-AWN FIRMS MANUFACTURING MNCs ALL MNCs
Mean 2.233 2.420 2.279
Median 1.516 1.619 1.563
S.D. 2.143 2.218 2.166
Mean 0.039 0.053 0.044
Median 0.043 0.051 0.043
S.D. 0.128 0.085 0.098
Mean 0.183 0.198 0.174
Median 0.131 0.145 0.126
S.D. 0.494 0.505 0.504
Mean 2.542 2.669 2.704
Median 2.711 2.833 2.833
S.D. 1.313 1.195 1.213
Mean 0.298 0.305 0.295
Median 0.258 0.277 0.260
S.D. 0.217 0.220 0.215
Mean 9.413 9.666 9.713
Median 9.467 9.648 9.661
S.D. 1.603 1.390 1.376
Tobin's Q
MULTI
SIZE
ROA
AvgStockRet
FS
Sector Low High Total % of total % of sector
Manufacturing 32 22 54 34.18% 7.58%
Telecommunications 7 8 15 9.49% 8.00%
Food & Drinks 4 1 5 3.16% 12.73%
Chemicals & Pharma 13 14 27 17.09% 17.09%
Electricity & Energy 11 5 16 10.13% 14.81%
Petroleum Refining 4 6 10 6.33% 10.42%
Mining Oil & Gas 3 6 9 5.70% 10.98%
Other 14 8 22 13.92% 14.10%
Total 88 70 158 100% 10.27%
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix among key variables 
 
The overall sample consists of 1389 multinational firms (non-negative equity) listed in the Compustat database during 1996-
2005. 165 firms were classified as real options aware; 158 were MNCs. Tobin´s Q: the ratio of the market value of a firm’s 
assets (measured by the market value of its outstanding equity and the book value of its debt) to its replacement cost (firm’s 
book value of assets), ROA: forward average return-on-assets over three years, AvgStkRtn: average stock returns over three 
years. RO-AWN: degree of real options awareness, MULTI: degree of multinationality (countries), FS: foreign sales ratio, 
GO: strategic growth options measured as {GO = f (idiosyncratic volatility, skewness, organizational slack, cash flow 
coverage, cumulative sales growth, market power, R&D intensity)}. INVG: the change in capital expenditures, β: beta 
calculated based on 36 monthly returns, SIZE: measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, LEV: leverage measured by 
(the natural logarithm of) total liabilities divided by firm market value.   
Variable MULTI FS RO-AWN GO ΔGO β INVG SIZE LEV MCON INTANG VOLAT RD
MULTI 1.000
FS 0.025 1.000
RO-AWN 0.544 0.012 1.000
GO -0.048 -0.025 -0.063 1.000
ΔGO 0.001 0.026 0.003 0.017 1.000
β 0.034 -0.008 0.031 0.061 -0.012 1.000
INVG -0.010 0.009 -0.012 0.005 0.007 -0.033 1.000
SIZE 0.200 0.006 0.244 -0.341 -0.003 0.092 -0.063 1.000
LEV 0.019 0.006 0.024 -0.162 -0.008 -0.114 -0.162 0.351 1.000
MCON 0.010 -0.015 -0.003 -0.133 -0.017 -0.020 -0.075 -0.014 0.120 1.000
INTANG -0.030 0.005 0.067 -0.023 0.002 0.027 0.005 -0.135 -0.036 -0.027 1.000
VOLAT -0.008 -0.029 0.025 -0.144 0.029 -0.340 -0.022 0.335 -0.046 0.073 -0.068 1.000
RD 0.005 0.011 -0.020 -0.126 -0.168 -0.024 -0.004 -0.054 0.150 0.075 -0.041 -0.075 1.000
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Table 3 
First-stage regression results on the determinants of multinationality (MULTI), real options 
awareness (RO-AWN) and growth options (GO). 
 
Panel A. Determinants of multinationality 
 
Table 3 Panel A shows our first-stage regression results for endogenous variable MULTI. MULTI is instrumented by 
market concentration (MCON), intangibles (INTANG), firm-specific volatility (VOLAT), R&D intensity (RD) with 
controls for prior performance (ROA or Q), prior size (SIZE) and prior level of multinationality (MULTI); the predicted 
value of MULTI is then used in the second-stage regression.  
 
 
 
 
Market Concentration (MCON) L <0.001 <0.001
(market pow er advantage hypothesis) (0.82) (3.24)***
Intagibles (INTANG) L -0.793 -0.010
(internalization or transaction costs theory) (-4.01)*** (-3.86)***
Volatility (VOLAT) L 0.001 0.002
(real options & diversif ication theories) (2.42)** (2.55)***
Research & Development (RD) L 0.192 <0.001
(know ledge-based theory) (0.53) (0.14)
Return on Assets (ROA) L 0.002
(past performance) (2.77)***
Tobin's Q (TQ) L 0.004
(past performance) (4.19)***
Multinationality (MULTI) L 0.515 0.266
(past degree of multinationality) (24.38)*** (30.72)***
Firm Size (SIZE) L 0.036 0.003
(past f irm size) (1.73)* (15.99)***
 Overall R2 0.726 0.725
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses
Depended variable: MULTI
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Panel B. Determinants of awareness (RO-AWN)    Panel C. Determinants of growth options (GO) 
 
 
Table 3 Panels B and C show our first-stage regression results for endogenous variables RO-AWN and GO. In Panel B: RO-
AWN is instrumented by prior performance (ROA or Q), prior size (SIZE) and prior level of multinationality (MULTI), with 
the predicted value of RO-AWN then used in the second-stage regression. In Panel C: strategic growth options GO is 
measured as {GO = f (idiosyncratic volatility, skewness, organizational slack, cash flow coverage, cumulative sales growth, 
market power, R&D intensity)}.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Size (SIZE) L 0.035 0.037 Firm-specific volatility (FSPVOL ) 0.193
(past f irm size) (8.94)*** (9.16)*** (19.96)***
Multinationality (MULTI) L 0.008 0.011 Leverage (LEV ) -0.054
(past degree of multinationality) (2.04)** (2.81)*** (-7.40)***
Return on Assets (ROA) L 0.376 Skewness (SKEW) 0.021
(past performance) (7.19)*** (2.45)***
Tobin's Q (TQ) L 0.018 Organizational slack (SGA )L 0.070
(past performance) (7.81)*** (6.14)***
Cash flow coverage (CFC )L -0.001
 Overall R2 0.779 0.801 (-0.40)
R&D intensity (RD )L 0.076
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (3.01)***
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses Cumulative sales growth (SG )L 0.001
(2.51)***
Market power (HHI ) 0.003
(5.57)***
 Overall R2 0.302
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses
Depended variable: RO-AWN Depended variable: GO
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Table 4 
             Panel A. Panel data regressions (2SLS) explaining firm value using Tobin’s Q 
 
Table 4 Panel A presents our main 2SLS results. Model 0 reports the impact of the control variables, including firm-specific 
business volatility or business uncertainty (σ), on firm value. Models 1, 1’ and 1’’ describe the incremental univariate impact of 
multinationality (MULTI), real options awareness (RO-AWN), and the joint GO and ΔGO variables alone, along with the control 
variables. Models 2 and 2’ present multivariate results with main variables MULTI and RO-AWN first alone and then controlling 
for GO and ΔGO. Model 3 reports the combined effects of MULTI, RO-AWN, GO and ΔGO, along with the interaction term 
MULTI*RO-AWN on Tobin’s Q while controlling for other effects. 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 1' Model 1'' Model 2 Model 2' Model 3
Multinationality (MULTI) L 0.427 0.143 0.095 0.164
(19.87)*** (10.68)*** (6.19)*** (5.08)***
Real Options Awareness (RO-AWN) L 0.104 0.487 0.582 0.646
(4.95)*** (2.08)*** (2.25)** (2.49)***
Interaction (MULTI*RO-AWN) L 0.715
(2.43)**
Growth Options (GO) L 0.383 0.819 0.820
(3.35)*** (13.73)*** (13.74)***
Change in Growth Options (ΔGO) 0.058 0.372 0.374
(2.27)** (5.61)*** (5.62)***
Systematic Risk (β) L 0.102 0.002 0.016 0.003 -0.046 -0.061 -0.062
(1.51) (0.11) (0.42) (0.07) (-3.63)*** (-3.55)*** (-3.60)***
Firm Size (SIZE) L 0.454 0.619 -0.269 -0.506 0.081 0.115 0.074
(5.11)*** (5.34)*** (-6.61)*** (-11.00)*** (4.64)*** (4.83)*** (2.51)***
Leverage (LEV) L -7.177 -3.018 -2.202 -0.922 -2.598 -2.598 -2.586
(-19.30)*** (-20.62)*** (-26.03)*** (-8.30)*** (-59.90)*** (-51.56)*** (-51.06)***
Interaction (SIZE*LEV) L 0.430 0.379 0.111 -0.189 0.216 0.171 0.171
(10.96)*** (9.86)*** (6.71)*** (-10.37)*** (20.25)*** (17.28)*** (17.33)***
Investment Growth (INVG) 3.317 0.463 -0.359 1.177 0.867 1.592 1.567
(2.28)** (2.21)** (-0.66) (1.77)* (5.51)*** (5.34)*** (5.25)***
Industry (IND) -0.001 -0.016 -0.049 -0.078 0.003 0.004 0.003
(-0.11) (-3.13)*** (-4.06)*** (-4.76)*** (0.77)*** (0.46) (0.34)
Business Uncertainty (σ) L 0.309
(3.24)***
 Overall R2 0.475 0.240 0.241 0.294 0.423 0.428 0.431
 Wald chi2 1697.42 1113.35 1990.61 1837.71 7754.35 7743.34 7754.78
 Model rho 0.979 0.703 0.755 0.895 0.679 0.682 0.679
 N 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses
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Table 4 
Panel B. Panel data regressions (2SLS) explaining firm value using alternative performance 
proxies (AvgStkRtn and ROA) 
 
Table 4 Panel B reports findings based on Models 2’ and 3 using alternative indicators of firm value and performance 
such as return-on-assets (ROA) and average stock returns (AvgStkRtn). Log (1+Tobin’s Q) findings are reported for 
comparison. 
 
  
 
 
Model 2' Model 3 Model 2' Model 3 Model 2' Model 3 
Multinationality (MULTI) L 0.120 0.115 0.068 0.051 0.512 0.512
(4.52)*** (5.18)*** (10.16)*** (6.28)*** (49.95)*** (49.94)***
Real Options Awareness (RO-AWN) L 0.051 0.107 0.063 0.050 0.398 0.380
(4.85)*** (5.49)*** (10.48)*** (7.08)*** (42.84)*** (36.73)***
Interaction (MULTI*RO-AWN) L 0.011 0.002 0.008
(7.68)*** (3.48)*** (3.89)***
Growth Options (GO) L 0.066 0.090 0.136 0.136 0.156 0.156
(2.52)*** (3.22)*** (20.93)*** (20.92)*** (10.42)*** (10.39)***
Change in Growth Options (ΔGO) 0.612 0.599 0.131 0.131 0.103 0.103
(24.75)*** (22.66)*** (18.50)*** (18.51)*** (8.06)*** (8.07)***
Systematic Risk (β) L 0.034 0.040 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.017
(4.71)*** (5.14)*** (5.31)*** (5.28)*** (3.91)*** (3.96)***
Firm Size (SIZE) L 0.071 0.190 0.005 0.030 0.049 0.032
(5.96)*** (8.98)*** (3.32)*** (3.69)*** (9.04)*** (4.52)***
Leverage (LEV) L -0.409 -0.432 -0.030 -0.029 -0.008 -0.008
(-20.48)*** (-19.85)*** (-4.13)*** (-4.07)*** (-29.29)*** (-29.27)***
Interaction (SIZE*LEV) L 0.023 0.026 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001
(6.27)*** (6.28)*** (4.01)*** (4.16)*** (27.12)*** (27.11)***
Investment Growth (INVG) 1.751 1.690 0.283 0.274 1.587 1.583
(12.96)*** (11.70)*** (5.76)*** (5.57)*** (22.11)*** (22.06)***
Industry (IND) 0.023 0.023 0.048 0.048 0.015 0.014
(6.50)*** (6.41)*** (6.19)*** (5.87)*** (7.61)*** (7.53)***
 Overall R2 0.122 0.124 0.257 0.254 0.325 0.326
 Wald chi2 2516.08 2233.93 2818.56 2831.69 5079.69 5101.2
 Model rho 0.208 0.241 0.533 0.534 0.629 0.627
 N 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses
1 2 3
Independent Variables AvgStkRtn ROA log(1+TobinsQ)
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Table 5 
Panel data regressions (2SLS) explaining firm value using alternative multinationality proxies 
 
Table 5 reports findings based on Model 3 (Table 4 Panel A) using alternative definitions of multinationality. These include 
the raw number of foreign countries ln (1+M), and the foreign sales (FS), foreign assets (FA) and foreign operating income 
(FOI) ratios. FA and FOI are residual-based proxies for multinationality (after controlling for size). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multinationality (MULTI) L 0.223 0.380 0.283 0.297 0.519 0.468
(21.80)*** (18.22)*** (10.70)*** (11.27)*** (9.73)*** (8.73)***
Real Options Awareness (RO-AWN) L 0.218 4.416 0.127 0.229 0.133 0.034
(3.54)*** (18.30)*** (12.02)*** (15.19)*** (5.74)*** (4.27)***
Interaction (MULTI*RO-AWN) L 0.031 0.702 0.042 0.043 0.040 0.040
(5.98)*** (3.16)*** (12.18)*** (10.81)*** (10.64)*** (8.81)***
Growth Options (GO) L 0.813 0.806 0.697 0.723 0.705 0.725
(14.65)*** (13.68)*** (12.54)*** (12.11)*** (12.66)*** (12.94)***
Change in Growth Options (ΔGO) 0.320 0.378 0.331 0.385 0.328 0.325
(5.28)*** (5.69)*** (5.47)*** (5.81)*** (5.41)*** (5.38)***
Systematic Risk (β) L -0.051 -0.034 -0.047 -0.054 -0.048 -0.049
(-3.29)*** (-2.02)** (-3.01)*** (-3.15)*** (-3.11)*** (-3.18)***
Firm Size (SIZE) L 0.079 3.791
(2.01)** (17.55)***
Leverage (LEV) L -2.367 -2.479 -2.238 -2.512 -2.256 -2.329
(-51.20)*** (-50.39)*** (-49.81)*** (-50.33)*** (-49.30)*** (-50.19)***
Interaction (SIZE*LEV) L 0.117 0.169 0.090 0.150 0.092 0.105
(13.24)*** (17.53)*** (10.31)*** (15.20)*** (10.35)*** (11.74)***
Investment Growth (INVG) 1.778 0.893 1.728 1.674 1.768 1.905
(6.49)*** (2.99)*** (6.34)*** (5.63)*** (6.47)*** (6.99)***
Industry (IND) 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.012
(1.18) (0.02) (1.49) (1.18) (1.56) (1.64)*
 Overall R2 0.435 0.464 0.430 0.427 0.426 0.431
 Wald chi2 9097.31 8081.15 9122.00 7832.55 9062.68 9183.49
 Model rho 0.672 0.653 0.688 0.684 0.690 0.691
 N 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses
Independent Variables MULTI=Ln(1+M) FS Residual_MULTI Residual_FS Residual_FA Residual_FOI
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Table 6 
Panel A. Robustness tests based on alternative samples and measurement specifications (MULTI 
and FS) 
 
Specification (1) shows our panel (2SLS) results based on Model 3 (Table 4 Panel A and Table 5 for FS) as a benchmark. Specification 
(2) uses a subset of multinational manufacturing firms. Specification (3) excludes smaller firms (ME < $ 20mil) from the overall sample. 
Specifications (4) and (5) use alternative definitions of real options awareness (RO-AWN), based on subsample analysis (dummy 
variables), first defined as a single dummy variable (0 non aware, 1 aware) and then second without the logarithmic transformation (A = 
0, 1, 2). Specification (6) tests the moderating effect of RO-AWN on INVG in the benchmark specification. Multinationality is defined as 
ln (1+M) and FS. Other variables are defined as before.  
 
 
MULTI FS MULTI FS MULTI FS MULTI FS MULTI FS MULTI FS
Multinationality (MULTI) L 0.164 0.380 0.175 0.447 0.145 0.377 0.162 0.558 0.176 0.561 0.165 0.380
(5.08)*** (18.22)*** (4.59)*** (17.88)*** (4.41)*** (17.78)*** (4.98)*** (12.73)*** (5.44)*** (12.84)*** (5.09)*** (18.21)***
Real Options Awareness (RO-AWN) L 0.646 4.416 0.561 5.218 0.507 4.400 0.505 5.323 0.882 5.342 0.610 4.417
(2.49)*** (18.30)*** (2.19)** (17.98)*** (2.01)** (17.89)*** (2.12)** (12.77)*** (2.76)*** (12.86)*** (2.35)** (18.30)***
Interaction (MULTI*RO-AWN) L 0.715 0.702 0.838 0.523 0.564 0.556 0.673 0.552 0.807 0.555 0.702 0.684
(2.43)** (3.16)*** (2.35)** (2.48)*** (1.89)* (2.59)*** (2.29)** (12.62)*** (2.70)*** (12.73)*** (2.38)** (3.08)***
Growth Options (GO) L 0.820 0.806 1.055 1.035 0.882 0.876 0.821 0.767 0.822 0.771 0.820 0.807
(13.74)*** (13.68)*** (13.29)*** (13.20)*** (13.37)*** (13.41)*** (13.76)*** (12.89)*** (13.78)*** (12.93)*** (13.76)*** (13.69)***
Change in Growth Options (ΔGO) 0.374 0.378 0.443 0.493 0.437 0.441 0.374 0.380 0.374 0.377 0.374 0.378
(5.62)*** (5.69)*** (5.43)*** (6.07)*** (5.87)*** (6.42)*** (5.62)*** (5.71)*** (5.63)*** (5.69)*** (5.63)*** (5.70)***
Systematic Risk (β) L -0.062 -0.034 -0.061 -0.034 -0.069 -0.039 -0.062 -0.085 -0.062 -0.088 -0.061 -0.034
(-3.60)*** (-2.02)** (-2.89)*** (-1.62)* (-3.78)*** (-2.16)** (-3.61)*** (-4.95)*** (-3.61)*** (-5.10)*** (-3.58)*** (-2.00)**
Firm Size (SIZE) L 0.074 3.791 0.110 -4.413 0.183 3.646 0.077 0.126 0.071 0.086 0.075 3.791
(2.51)*** (17.55)*** (3.22)*** (16.97)*** (5.87)*** (16.54)*** (2.62)*** (4.26)*** (2.40)** (2.89)*** (2.55)*** (17.55)***
Leverage (LEV) L -2.586 -2.479 -2.598 -2.540 -2.871 -2.823 -2.586 -2.447 -2.587 -2.539 -2.588 -2.481
(-51.06)*** (-50.39)*** (-43.63)*** (-44.08)*** (-48.28)*** (-48.40)*** (-51.07)*** (-49.10)*** (-51.12)*** (-50.45)*** (-51.10)*** (-50.42)***
Interaction (SIZE*LEV) L 0.171 0.169 0.188 0.203 0.209 0.219 0.171 0.155 0.172 0.171 0.172 0.170
(17.33)*** (17.53)*** (16.34)*** (18.19)*** (18.98)*** (20.26)*** (17.31)*** (15.93)*** (17.46)*** (17.48)*** (17.38)*** (17.58)***
Investment Growth (INVG) 1.567 0.893 1.559 1.094 1.553 1.078 1.568 1.103 1.566 1.316 1.511 0.836
(5.25)*** (2.99)*** (4.11)*** (2.88)*** (4.95)*** (3.45)*** (5.25)*** (3.69)*** (5.24)*** (4.41)*** (5.03)*** (2.79)***
Interaction (INVG*RO-AWN) 4.414 4.454
(1.67)* (1.69)*
Industry (IND) 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.015 0.003 0.000
(0.34) (0.02) (0.71) (0.66) (1.00) (1.00) (0.36) (1.66)* (0.37) (1.94)** (0.33) (0.03)
 Overall R2 0.431 0.464 0.470 0.518 0.441 0.481 0.430 0.441 0.432 0.447 0.431 0.465
 Wald chi2 7754.78 8081.15 5415.17 6041.82 7387.86 7896.6 7752.44 7788.19 7760.50 7984.92 7759.97 8087.04
 Model rho 0.679 0.653 0.648 0.571 0.665 0.633 0.679 0.663 0.676 0.666 0.678 0.653
 N 13890 13890 7120 7120 13840 13840 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890
 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses
1 2 3 4 5 6
All MNCs
RO-AWN=0,1,2
All MNCs, including 
INVG*RO-AWN
Independent Variables All MNCs Manufacturing MNCs
All MNCs
RO-AWN=0,1
All MNCs, excluding 
MVE<20mil.
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Table 6 
Panel B. Robustness tests based on alternative samples and measurement specifications 
(AvgStkRtn and ROA) 
 
Specification (1) shows our panel (2SLS) results based on Model 3 (Table 4 Panel B) as a benchmark. Specification (2) uses the subset of 
multinational manufacturing firms. Specification (3) excludes smaller firms (ME < $ 20mil) from the overall sample. Specifications (4) and 
(5) use alternative definitions of real options awareness (RO-AWN), based on subsample analysis (dummy variables), first defined as a single 
dummy variable (0 non aware, 1 aware) and then second without the logarithmic transformation (A = 0, 1, 2). Specification (6) tests the 
moderating effect of RO-AWN on INVG in the benchmark specification. The dependent variables are AvgStkRtn and ROA. Other variables are 
defined as before.  
 
 
 
 
 
AvgStkRtn ROA AvgStkRtn ROA AvgStkRtn ROA AvgStkRtn ROA AvgStkRtn ROA AvgStkRtn ROA
Multinationality (MULTI) L 0.115 0.051 0.109 0.053 0.089 0.070 0.053 0.007 0.040 0.007 0.117 0.052
(5.18)*** (6.28)*** (4.87)*** (6.31)*** (3.75)*** (8.71)*** (4.49)*** (3.63)*** (3.79)*** (3.66)*** (5.25)*** (6.38)***
Real Options Awareness (RO-AWN) L 0.107 0.050 0.103 0.052 0.078 0.064 0.445 0.178 0.348 0.198 0.109 0.051
(5.49)*** (7.08)*** (5.22)*** (7.07)*** (3.79)*** (9.18)*** (4.15)*** (5.48)*** (3.35)*** (5.61)*** (5.58)*** (7.18)***
Interaction (MULTI*RO-AWN) L 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.070 0.004 0.051 0.004 0.011 0.002
(7.68)*** (3.48)*** (7.21)*** (3.32)*** (9.07)*** (3.75)*** (3.93)*** (8.96)*** (3.18)*** (9.04)*** (7.76)*** (3.29)***
Growth Options (GO) L 0.090 0.136 0.088 0.138 0.094 0.182 0.068 0.126 0.069 0.126 0.090 0.136
(3.22)*** (20.92)*** (3.11)*** (20.43)*** (2.73)*** (24.09)*** (2.43)** (19.72)*** (2.49)** (19.75)*** (3.25)*** (20.88)***
Change in Growth Options (ΔGO) 0.599 0.131 0.604 0.133 0.577 0.048 0.604 0.123 0.604 0.123 0.599 0.131
(22.66)*** (18.51)*** (22.10)*** (18.11)*** (19.30)*** (4.73)*** (22.79)*** (17.47)*** (22.79)*** (17.49)*** (22.64)*** (18.49)***
Systematic Risk (β) L 0.040 0.014 0.035 0.014 0.032 0.016 0.041 0.013 0.041 0.014 0.041 0.014
(5.14)*** (5.28)*** (4.35)*** (5.29)*** (3.55)*** (5.73)*** (5.24)*** (5.21)*** (5.19)*** (5.23)*** (5.18)*** (5.32)***
Firm Size (SIZE) L 0.190 0.030 0.183 0.029 0.190 0.034 0.080 0.070 0.069 0.071 0.193 0.029
(8.98)*** (3.69)*** (8.60)*** (3.47)*** (8.55)*** (4.29)*** (5.84)*** (11.35)*** (5.32)*** (11.41)*** (9.08)*** (3.50)***
Leverage (LEV) L -0.432 -0.029 -0.428 -0.027 -0.419 -0.018 -0.448 -0.031 -0.447 -0.031 -0.433 -0.030
(-19.85)*** (-4.07)*** (-19.40)*** (-3.68)*** (-14.80)*** (-2.19)** (-20.52)*** (-4.34)*** (-20.46)*** (-4.38)*** (-19.90)*** (-4.13)***
Interaction (SIZE*LEV) L 0.026 0.006 0.026 0.006 0.021 0.006 0.027 0.005 0.028 0.005 0.026 0.006
(6.28)*** (4.16)*** (6.25)*** (3.81)*** (4.23)*** (3.68)*** (6.61)*** (3.64)*** (6.80)*** (3.72)*** (6.35)*** (4.25)***
Investment Growth (INVG) 1.690 0.274 1.867 0.290 1.766 0.327 1.683 0.279 1.673 0.278 1.670 0.273
(11.70)*** (5.57)*** (12.07)*** (5.33)*** (11.36)*** (6.43)*** (11.63)*** (5.66)*** (11.57)*** (5.66)*** (11.52)*** (5.54)***
Interaction (INVG*RO-AWN) 0.799 0.385
(1.64)* (2.48)***
Industry (IND) 0.023 0.048 0.023 0.047 0.023 0.049 0.024 0.048 0.024 0.048 0.023 0.048
(6.41)*** (5.87)*** (6.20)*** (5.59)*** (6.03)*** (7.31)*** (6.70)*** (11.77)*** (6.64)*** (11.86)*** (6.38)*** (5.69)***
 Overall R2 0.124 0.254 0.127 0.257 0.130 0.285 0.122 0.242 0.122 0.243 0.124 0.255
 Wald chi2 2233.93 2831.69 2120.20 2623.83 1858.13 3073.45 2179.56 2808.55 2173.15 2810.30 2237.24 2838.46
 Model rho 0.241 0.534 0.227 0.536 0.317 0.406 0.239 0.533 0.240 0.533 0.241 0.534
 N 13890 13890 7120 7120 13840 13840 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890 13890
 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses
5 6
All MNCs
RO-AWN=0,1,2
All MNCs, including 
INVG*RO-AWN
1 2 3 4
Independent Variables All MNCs Manufacturing MNCs
All MNCs, excluding 
MVE<20mil.
All MNCs
RO-AWN=0,1
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Table 7 
Robustness test comparisons: Accounting for self-selection and endogeneity (Heckman and 
Propensity) 
 
Specification (1) shows our panel (2SLS) results considering domestic and multinational firms (excluding negative equity) 
using MULTI and FS as multinationality proxies. Specification (2) shows the Heckman two-stage results using MULTI and 
FS as alternative multinationality proxies. Specification (3) shows the two-stage propensity score matching results using 
MULTI and FS as alternative proxies for multinationality. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Other variables are defined 
as before.  
MULTI FS MULTI FS MULTI FS
Multinationality (MULTI) L 0.171 0.385 0.482 0.391 0.152 0.456
(5.26)*** (18.48)*** (0.90) (16.93)*** (5.09)*** (19.50)***
Real Options Awareness (RO-AWN) L 0.724 4.482 0.782 4.423 0.306 5.321
(2.79)*** (18.58)*** (2.93)*** (18.41)*** (1.69)* (19.61)***
Interaction (MULTI*RO-AWN) L 0.772 0.607 0.778 0.605 0.725 0.604
(2.60)*** (2.82)*** (3.59)*** (2.68)*** (2.68)*** (2.68)***
Growth Options (GO) L 0.815 0.844 0.821 0.807 0.962 0.882
(13.70)*** (13.80)*** (13.76)*** (13.66)*** (14.33)*** (13.79)***
Change in Growth Options (ΔGO) 0.377 0.432 0.371 0.374 0.296 0.438
(5.64)*** (6.37)*** (5.59)*** (5.68)*** (4.40)*** (5.83)***
Selection Bias correction - Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR) 1.864 -0.371
(0.98) (-1.02)
Systematic Risk (β) L -0.060 -0.038 -0.060 -0.037 -0.066 -0.014
(-3.47)*** (-2.18)** (-3.49)*** (-2.16)** (-3.80)*** (-2.76)***
Firm Size (SIZE) L 0.028 3.802 0.172 3.760 0.132 4.563
(2.96)*** (17.60)*** (7.88)*** (17.49)*** (4.77)*** (18.78)***
Leverage (LEV) L -2.492 -2.550 -2.609 -2.571 -2.403 -2.519
(-49.72)*** (-47.97)*** (-51.63)*** (-51.74)*** (-40.57)*** (-47.43)***
Interaction (SIZE*LEV) L 0.155 0.180 0.168 0.185 0.132 0.190
(15.80)*** (17.64)*** (17.03)*** (19.08)*** (12.61)*** (18.18)***
Investment Growth (INVG) 1.354 1.130 1.561 1.098 1.840 0.980
(4.52)*** (3.76)*** (5.43)*** (3.70)*** (6.31)*** (2.99)***
Industry (IND) 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.015 0.009
(0.07) (0.80) (0.52) (0.26) (2.09)** (2.03)**
 Overall R2 0.426 0.470 0.425 0.469 0.482 0.478
 Wald chi2 7566.94 8000.16 7708.38 8285.62 7726.48 7001.05
 Model rho 0.677 0.633 0.687 0.656 0.501 0.643
 N 52020 52020 12500 12500 10890 10890
 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
L lagged (t-1)
z-statistics are in parentheses
Independent Variables 2SLS Heckman Propensity
1 2 3
